Bringing home the money: what determines worker's remittances to transition countries? by Schrooten, Mechthild
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Bringing home the money: what determines worker's







RightDiscussion Paper Series A No.466
Bringing Home the Money -
What Determines Worker's Remittances to
Transition Countries?
Mechthild Schrooten
(Associate Professor, The Institute of Economic Research,
Hitotsubashi University
DIW Berlin [German Institute for Economic Research]) ʗ
Septermber, 2005
The Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University









Bringing Home the Money - 























Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603, 
JAPAN tel. +81-42-580-8356, e-mail: mechtild@ier.hit-u.ac.jp and DIW Berlin German Institute 
for Economic Research,  Koenigin-Luise-Str. 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany, tel. +49-30-89789-344, 
fax +49-3089789-108, mschrooten@diw.de  
 
*I thank Wolfgang Haerle for excellent research assistance.  
 
Bringing home the money  



















Workers’ remittances are a major source of external finance in many former socialist 
countries. While previous studies showed that remittances have a positive impact on 
economic development, this study focuses on the determinants of remittances. 
Therefore, dynamic panel-data estimation techniques are applied. Major findings are: 
Remittances per capita and remittances in percent of GDP are driven by similar 
factors. In general, remittances are highly persistent and increase with the domestic 
unemployment rate. A higher GDP per capita as well as a higher degree of 
international integration of the sending countries’ real sector leads to a decrease of 
remittances. In addition, there seems to evidence that remittances operate as a 
substitute for a well performing domestic banking sector. Institutional development 
seems to have no significant influence on the size of remittances. However, 
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1. Motivation  
 
 
Transition led to a tremendous increase of all kind of cross-border flows from and to 
former socialist countries. While there exists a huge literature on the determinants of 
trade, international capital flows and migration, the analysis of the determinants of 
workers’ remittances to these countries seems to be almost neglected.
1 However, 
this financial flows amounted for more than 10.8 billion US-dollar in 2003. In many 
countries remittances are higher than the sum of official aid programs.  
Usually, remittances as well as migration are considered as the result of differences 
in income and productivity between a sending and a hosting country. In general, 
three strands of literature concerning the macroeconomics of remittances can be 
detected. One group argues that remittances are similar to other international capital 
flows, since both kind of cross-border activities lead to higher foreign exchange and 
induce higher investment in the home country (Djajic 1986, Quibria 1996, Taylor et al. 
1996, Taylor 1999). In contrast to this, a second group of authors focus on the 
adverse effects caused by remittances. Since the economy can spend more than it 
produces, remittances might lead to “Dutch disease” effects, encourage for future 
migration, lead to a high dependency of the economy and the families on these kind 
of financial funds (Martin 1990, Boone 1995). The third group of authors tries to bring 
together the above mentioned arguments. Glytsos (1997) as well as 
McCormick/Wahba (2000) showed that the effects of remittances on the home 
country depend to a high degree on domestic policy, especially concerning the 
overall investment climate.  
Seminal empirical work on the macroeconomics of remittances was conducted by 
Swamy (1981) who employed a broad set of country specific variables to explain the 
general patterns of remittances. Recent empirical studies come to the result that 
remittances have a positive impact on the economy in the home country of the 
remitter (World Bank 1995; El-Sakka/McNabb 1995; IMF 2005). Focusing on 
transition countries León-Ledesma/Piracha (2004) show that remittances have a 
highly positive impact on productivity and employment in the home country. While the 
consensus of empirical studies on impact of remittances on the home country 
increased during the last years, there is no strong consensus about the determinants  
2 
of remittances (Buch/Kuckulenz 2004; Buch et al. 2002; Adelman/Taylor 1990; 
Straubhaar 1986). A comprehensive study concerning the determinants of 
remittances to transition countries is – to my knowledge – still missing.  
Therefore, this paper seeks to fill at least three analytical gaps: First, the study 
focuses on a broad set of transition countries. Within this setting, the determinants of 
remittances to 24 former socialist countries during the period of 1990 to 2003 are 
analyzed (Appendix, table 1). Second, to take advantage of the full information in the 
data set, panel estimation techniques are employed. Third, since the former socialist 
countries underwent far reaching legal changes the impact of the general institutional 
situation as well as the influence of wars is analyzed. Main findings are: The 
determinants of remittances in percent of GDP (REM 1) and remittances per capita 
(REM 2) are similar. In general, remittances seem to increase with problems of the 
domestic economy. There is no specific impact of the quality of the institutional 
framework on the size of remittances. In addition, remittances per capita increase in 
times of war. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next chapter, some stylized facts on the 
size and importance of workers’ remittances are presented. Chapter three 
reconsiders the “theory of remittances”. Chapter four outlines the econometric 
approach. In Chapter five, the empirical results are discussed. In the conclusion, 
findings are summarized and some policy recommendations are developed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
1  Conceptually, workers remittances are defined to be transfers that migrants return to their 
home country.  
3 
2. Stylized facts  
 
 
In times of the socialism, migration to Western countries was very difficult while 
migration within the Eastern bloc was comparable easy. After the collapse of the 
socialist system, migration from transition countries followed different patterns. First, 
between 1991 and 1992 migration was primarily consisting of minority ethnic groups; 
this type of the migration was permanent.
2 Second, from 1993 many host countries 
started to introduce more restrictive policies. This was often accompanied by 
facilitating seasonal work and subcontracted employment.
3 Third, in the mid of the 
90ies was an active asylum policy for refugees from former Yugoslavia – with the 
perspective to repatriate these people in times of peace. Taking these different 
patterns into account it can be said, that over time the incentive for temporary 
movement increased, while the incentive for permanent  migration decreased. 
Nevertheless, in the years 1990-2000 most of these countries reported a negative 
net migration (figure 1). The important exception is the Russian Federation which 
shows a high positive net migration figure. This is at least partly due to considerable 
migration from other former Soviet republics, which seems to follow three rules: (1) 
forced migration from areas with ethnic or civil war, (2) post-Soviet repatriation of 
ethnic Russians to Russia and (3) economic reasons (Codagnone 1998).   
 
                                                                 
2  These flows were mainly directed to Germany, Finland, and Turkey. Turkey took a little 
more than 300000 Bulgarians of Turkish origin. 
3   For instance, the agreement between Poland and Germany meant that there were nearly 
200000 seasonal and about the same number of temporary contract workers employed in 
Germany in 1999.  
4 
Figure 1:  Net Migration (1990-2000), in thousands 
 
Source: The World Bank. World Development Indicators CD ROM 2005. Own calculations.  
 
 
While workers’ remittances and migration are strongly linked, they are not totally 
correlated. Furthermore, while migration streams have matured of time workers’ 
remittances increased.  Workers’ remittances are transfers from a citizen living 
abroad to the home country. Therefore workers’ remittances appear in the current 
account of the balance of payment system and are conceptually part of the gross 
national product.
4 In general, the International Monetary Fund distinguishes between 
three categories of migrants’ transfers: (1) workers’ remittances, from workers living 
abroad for more than one year, (2) compensation of employees, from workers living 
abroad less than one year and (3) migrants’ transfers, which reflect the migrants’ 
claims on residents of an economy. The most important data source for 
workers‘ remittances are the Balance of Payment Statistics (BoP) published by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset 
available by the World Bank (for details see Appendix, table 2).  
                                                                 
4   Despite the fact that remittances, as money earned abroad by nationals, are part of Gross 














































































































































































































































In 2003, official remittances to the 24 transition countries under consideration 
(Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and 
Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine)
5 amounted for more than 10.8 
billion US-dollar. Reported remittances over the period 1992-2003 were above 71.4 
billion US-dollar.
6   
 
 
Figure 2:  Remittances to transition countries 
US-DOLLAR million 
 
Source: The World Bank. World Development Indicators CD ROM 2005. Own calculations.  
 
 
All in all, we have to bear in mind that these figures only represent the official data. 
Remittances are relatively difficult to measure, since migrants send money back to 
their country of origin in a variety of ways. This might be also due to the fact of high 
                                                                 
5  While these countries share the past as a socialist economy nowadays eight of them 
joined the European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia). 
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6 
transaction costs
7  and strong regulations. According the information of Western 
Union now, sending 100 Euro from Germany leads to a general transfer fee of 14.50 
Euro, and therefore of 14.5%. (for details see box 1). As other emerging economies 
transition countries have well-designed informal channels through which earnings 
and transfers in kind might reach the home country of the migrant.
8 Therefore it can 
be assumed that official figures tend to underestimate the real size of remittances, 
consequently remittances reported in the balance-of-payments statistics have to be 
considered as a minimum level.
9 
Despite these general data problems, official figures indicate, that remittances are 
increasing over time. Nevertheless, the magnitude of remittances differs widely 
among the countries under consideration. Table 1 shows that in nominal terms, 
within the group of the transition countries the Russian Federation is the most 
important recipient of remittances, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems to 
be noteworthy, that within the group of the ten biggest recipients there are four new 
member states of the EU: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary. 
Nevertheless, remittances measured in nominal terms give only first insights 
concerning the importance of these cross-border transfers for a given country. More 
meaningful are the remittances per capita. In 2003, by far the highest per capita 
remittances where received in Bosnia/Herzegovina, Albania, Croatia and Slovenia. 
These are countries which were - directly or in the case of Albania indirectly
10- hit by 
civil war following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.  
                                                                 
7  Involving both explicit fees and exchange rate spreads. 
8  Anecdotal evidence suggests that incentives such as tax exemptions or preferential credits 
for migrants may affect significantly the share of remittances sent through the banking 
system (official remittances). IMF (2005): World Economic Outlook.  p. 83. 
9  Estimations of the size of these  informal transfers are difficult. A recent IMF study on the 
size of workers’ remittances comes to the result that worldwide informal remittances reach 
the amount of  around  10 billion US-dollar  per annum (El-Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson 
2002). To tackle the data problems a joint working group of the IMF and the World Bank 
started in January 2005 with a focus on the measurement problems concerning workers’ 
remittances.  
  http://www.worldbank.org/data/remittances.html#s1. 
10  Concerning the specifics of Albania see Korovilas (1999).  
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Table1: Workers’ Remittances in 2003 
   Remittances  
in mill. US-dollar    
Remittances per capita in 
US-dollar 
Poland  2314  Bosnia and Herzegovina  285 
Russian Federation  1453  Albania  281 
Serbia and Montenegro  1397  Croatia  241 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1178  Serbia and Montenegro  172 
Croatia 1069  Slovenia 128 
Albania 889  Moldova  110 
Czech Republic  500  Macedonia, FYR  83 
Moldova 465  Slovak  Republic  79 
Slovak Republic  425  Latvia  74 
Ukraine 330  Poland  61 
 
Source: Wordbank: World Development Indicators. CD ROM 2005.  Own calculations. 
 
 
The dependency of a country on remittances can be measured in terms of GDP and 
exports. Table 2 shows that the group of the top ten remittances-depending countries 
is dominated by the successor states of the former Soviet Union and former 
Yugoslavia. By far the highest dependency on remittances, measured in percent of 
GDP, was reached in Moldova. Here, remittances amounted for more than 20 per 
cent of GDP, a figure which is extraordinary high, even in international comparison. 
Measuring the dependency of the domestic economy on remittances in terms of 
exports of goods and services the picture changes only a little bit. Furthermore, there 
seems to be evidence that remittances are most important for relatively small 
economies with a low income level. Especially in countries belonging to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as in former Yoguslavian 
countries remittances of labour migrants are a critical component of income.   
8 
Table 2: Economic Dependency on Remittances 2003 
Remittances in percent of 
GDP   
Remittances in percent of 
exports 
Moldova 23.7  Albania  76.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  16.9  Bosnia and Herzegovina  66.9 
Albania 14.5  Moldova  44.1 
Serbia and Montenegro  6.7  Serbia and Montenegro  35.2 
Georgia 6.2  Georgia  19.4 
Armenia 6.0  Armenia  18.8 
Kyrgyz Republic  5.7  Kyrgyz Republic  14.9 
Croatia 3.7  Macedonia,  FYR  9.7 
Macedonia, FYR  3.7  Croatia  7.9 
Azerbaijan 2.4  Azerbaijan 5.6 
 
Source: Wordbank: World Development Indicators. CD ROM 2005.  Own calculations. 
 
 
Table 3: Remittances, FDI and official aid 2003 
Remittances  
in percent of of FDI (net) 
 
Remittances  
in percent of official aid 
Moldova 796.6  Croatia  886.5 
Albania 499.3  Belarus 507.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  308.6  Moldova  398.8 
Kyrgyz Republic  237.1  Slovenia  386.8 
Macedonia, FYR  181.4  Slovak Republic  265.9 
Armenia 139.4  Albania  259.7 
Serbia and Montenegro  100.1  Bosnia and Herzegovina  218.7 
Belarus 95.1  Poland  194.2 
Lithuania 81.0  Czech  Republic  189.9 
Slovak Republic  79.3  Latvia  150.4 
 
Source: Wordbank: World Development Indicators. CD ROM 2005. Own calculations. 
 
 
Since remittances are a significant source of income in many countries, in several 
economies the amount of inward remittances is higher than that of official aid 
programs and FDI inflows (table 3). In addition, the investigation of the volatility of 
reported remittances shows that this kind of cross-border flows is relatively stable. 
They do not show the relatively high volatility which is usually associated with private 






Figure 3:  Volatility* (1992-2003) 
 
 
*Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of the relevant inflow to GDP. 





The oldest method to send remittances is sending the money by a courier. 
Nowadays, there exist several ways to transfer the money to the home country. 
International money transfer companies, which are usually considered as non-bank 
financial institutions, are specialized on this task. The fees to send money abroad 
usually depend on the amount: In the case of sending money from Germany – one 
important hosting country for migrants from former socialist countries -, Western 
Union takes  a fee of 8.5 Euro for amounts to 40 Euros, for amounts to 75 Euros a 
fee of 10 Euros, to 145 Euros a fee of 14.50 Euros, for amounts to 215 Euros a fee of 
19 Euros, for amounts to 290 Euros a fee of 23 Euros, for amounts to 360 Euros a 
fee of 26.5 Euro, for amounts to 540 Euro a fee of 30 Euro, for amounts to 720 Euros 
a fee of 33.5 Euros, for amounts to 895 a fee of 39 Euros and for amounts to 1075  
Euros a fee of 42.5 Euros. However, the upper limit for sending money with Western 
Union to these countries is 1000 Euro. While these fees are the same concerning all 
the transition countries under consideration, big cost differences emerge due to 
considerable exchange rate spreads. In 2001, Western Union realized around 13 









Remittances FDI Export 
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3. The Economic Rational of Remittances  
 
 
There is a huge theoretical literature focusing on the motives of migrants to remit 
money to their relatives in there home country. Most of these studies use a 
microeconomic approach. Seminal theoretical work on remittances was done by 
Lucas and Stark (1985; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark 1991), who interpreted the 
phenomenon of remittances in the context of the new economics of labor migration 
(NELM), and therefore with respect to contract theory.  In this context, the decision 
on migration and remittances is part of the overall family/household decision making 
process. In general, these models argue on the base of an implicit insurance scheme 
between the migrant and future remitter and the household of origin. Furthermore, 
these models usually explain that the household owns uneducated and a certain 
share of well educated labour; it is assumed that non-educated labour can only be 
offered at home. Therefore, only an “inner-group” of the household is considered as 
to be able to earn money abroad. Nevertheless, since well-educated labour can also 
be offer on the domestic market, the household has to decide whether a member 
migrates or not. The families engage in education and sending costs, while the 
migrants share their income with their family left in the sending country. From a life-
cycle perspective remittances decline with the length of the stay of the migrant in the 
foreign country and tend to decline with the decision of the migrant to settle down in 
the host country. According to these theoretical considerations migrants play an 
important role as financial intermediaries by providing the sending family financial 
resources and offering income insurance. While Lucas and Stark argue within a 
unitary household model, other authors try alternative ways of conceptualizing the 
household decision making on migration and remittances (Hoddinott 1994, Posel 
2001). Katseli/Glytsos (1986) distinguish between “required” and “desired” 
remittances. While required remittances are based on intrafamily obligations; the 
latter can be explained as a part of the portfolio choice of the migrant. Therefore, the 
performance of the domestic financial sector seems to be an important factor 
concerning the size of remittances. Building on the idea of an intrafamily loan 
contract developed by Stark, Poirine (1997) considers the family as an informal 
financial market with an implicit financial contract and finds explanations for self-
interest motivations to remit. Three phases of the contract can be distinguished: First, 
the family invests into the future migrant. Second, the migrant remits a significant  
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amount to play back the implicit loan. Third, before returning to their home country 
the migrant invests the own accumulated capital into the domestic economy and 
therefore increases the size of remittances. In the case of permanent migration 
remittances decrease over time. All in all, these microeconomic theoretical models 
emphasize the impact of the income situation of the household, the costs of migration 
and the performance of the financial sector in the domestic economy on the amount 
and size of remittances.   
In comparison to the microeconomic literature the theoretical literature on the 
macroeconomics of remittances, especially on the determinants of remittances is 
much less rich. Nevertheless, three types of models can be detected. First, there is a 
class of models arguing that remittances have a positive impact on the domestic 
economic development since they provide a fund for higher savings and foreign 
exchange. Within this framework remittances are often considered as to perform 
similar functions as other international flows and thus to broaden the base for 
economic development (Connell/Conwey 2000). This again might have a positive 
impact on investment; the catching-up process of a given emerging economy will be 
faster. A second strand of literature focuses on the adverse effects of remittances. 
These studies show that a high dependency on remittances might decrease the 
incentives for a sufficient domestic economic policy. Furthermore, worker sending 
countries might get accustomed to these additional funding (Martin 1990). The 
incentives for creating an efficient domestic institutional framework, which enables 
the economy for catching up might be decreasing. Furthermore, there might be a 
continuing trend for substituting a sufficient economic policy by higher future 
migration. In addition, “Dutch disease” effects might occur. A third strand of literature 
tries to bring together the pro and cons mentioned above. Since remittances 
influence investment and growth in many ways, directly and indirectly, these studies 
clearly show that the impact of remittances on the domestic economy highly depend 
on the domestic policy (Glytsos 1997; McCormick/Wahba 2000).  
Summing up, the theoretical literature comes to the result that the size of remittances 
is depending as well as on subjective as on more general, objective factors. 
Concerning the subjective factors the duration of the stay, the skills and earnings of 
the migrant as well as the economic situation of the family of origin might play a 
crucial role. Concerning the objective factors, macroeconomic conditions in the home 
country might be important. Especially, the he average income level and the  
12 
unemployment rate seem directly and indirectly effect the situation of the household 
of origin. In addition, remittances are often considered an instrument to overcome 
constraints and market failures in the domestic financial sector.   
13 
4. Econometric Issues and Modelling 
 
 
Two significant problems arise when the determinants of remittances are investigated 
empirically. First, the share of remittances to GDP might be rather persistent, i.e. the 
current values might on the past values. Therefore, a dynamic model specification is 
required. Second, it is very likely that many of the explanatory variables are 
determined jointly with the dependent variable. To tackle these issues dynamic panel 
data models using the first-differenced GMM estimator are estimated in this study 
(see Arellano/Bond 1991). This estimation procedure provides a framework that 
enables us to deal explicitly with the problem of potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables using a set of appropriate instrument variables.  
 
Therefore, throughout this study, we estimate dynamic panel data models of the form 
 
(1)      , 2 1 , 1 it it t i it x rem rem ν β β α + + + = −  
 
it rem  denoting the share of remittances to GDP, xit the set of potential explanatory 
variables,  it ν  a white-noise disturbance term, and i and t denoting country and time 
period, respectively with  i β  and α  as estimation coefficients.
11 For each model, the 
validity of the instrument variables is checked using the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions (see e.g. Arellano/Bond 1991). The hypothesis being tested 
with the Sargan test is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to some set of 
residuals, and therefore they are acceptable, healthy, instruments. The model 
specification is confirmed if the null hypothesis, stating that the instruments are valid, 
cannot be rejected. Furthermore, since the consistency of the GMM estimator 
depends upon the assumption that the disturbance terms are not serially correlated, 
we always check for this, exploiting the fact that if the disturbance terms are serially 
correlated, we will detect second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals. The lack of second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals 
                                                                 
11  Other recent estimation approaches such as the Pooled Mean Group Estimation 
(Pesaran/Shin/Smith 1999) which allow for a higher degree of heterogeneity across 
countries, require that the number of time series observations be large enough that the  
14 
therefore indicates that the disturbance terms are serially uncorrelated.
12  The 
dynamic specification is required to assure that the parameters of interest can be 
identified and precisely estimated (see Bond 2002). Then, insignificant variables are 
excluded from the initial model step by step until a “core” specification is achieved, 
which is called the baseline model. Finally, additional potentially relevant variables 
are checked one by one to see whether they fit into the model.  
To analyze the determinants of remittances two dependent variables are defined: the 
inflow of remittances into country i over GDP and remittances per capita. The 
remittances to GDP ratio can be considered as the dependency of the country on 
remittances. The remittances per capita might give some insights on the dependency 
of the population on this kind of financial flows. Since the paper concentrates on the 
situation in the country of origin the set of independent variables includes  
 
•  Lagged remittances. Since the share of remittances to GDP seems to be 
relatively stable and rather persistent. Since the current value might depend 
on the past value, thus, a dynamic model specification is used to test for this. 
•  The general economic situation in the home country is captured by GDP per 
capita, which is a proxy for income level. Microeconomic studies show that 
negative shocks to output, employment, and wages in the home country may 
encourage migrants to send more remittances. Since a higher level of 
domestic income makes remittances to support relatives less necessary, a 
negative sign is expected.         
•  The Domestic labor market situation is covered by the unemployment rate. 
Unemployment is used as an indicator for tensions on the domestic labor 
market and uncertainty concerning wage income. High unemployment rates 
give an incentive to migrate and may be also to return money to the home 
country. Therefore a positive sign is expected. In addition the female labour 
market participation rate is taken to check for the general access of women to 
the labour market in the domestic country. Thereby it is expected that a higher 
female labour market participation rate and therefore a better access of 
women to the labour market is accompanied by lower remittances.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
model can be estimated for each country separately. This cannot be applied to our short 
panel.  
15 
• The  openness of a given economy and its international integration is 
measured by the standard indicator, the sum of exports and imports over GDP. 
A higher degree of international integration of the real sector makes the export 
of labor forces - which is a precondition for remittances - less attractive. 
Therefore, a negative sign of this variable is expected. 
•  The future perspectives of the economy are mirrored in the growth rate per 
capita. Since economic growth might increase the incentive for investment in 
the home country a positive sign is expected.  
•  Remittances might be caused by the lack of domestic credit and the weakness 
of the domestic banking sector. Therefore, the variable domestic credit to 
the private sector in percent of GDP as well as the variable spread defined 
as the difference between lending and deposit rate are taken to capture the 
performance of the domestic banking system. Since remittances are often 
considered as to be substitute for formal credit, to soften the budget constraint 
of the household of origin and to offer an additional source of funding, it is 
assumed that the sign of the variable credit to the private sector is negative. In 
addition, the spread between lending and deposit rate is considered as an 
indicator for transaction costs and efficiency in the banking sector. As higher 
these “sunk” costs as lower the performance of the banking sector. A lower 
performance of the banking sector - reflected in higher transaction costs - are 
expected to lead to higher remittances.  
•  In addition, two variables concerning general institutional situation of the 
countries are employed. First, since many of these countries were hit by major 
wars, a dummy variable controls for the influence of such far reaching conflicts 
on remittances. The variable “war” takes the value of 1 for the years of war 
and for the first two years in the post-war period and the value of zero 
otherwise. It is assumed that in times of war a higher amount of remittances is 
transferred to the country. Second, the quality of the institutional framework is 
an appropriate indicator was constructed using the data of the EBRD transition 
report, by calculating  the average of the EBRD transition index on enterprise 
reform, competition policy, banking sector reform and reform of non-bank 
financial institutions. In general, the index for institutional development runs 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 Since in small samples, like our data set, the two-stage GMM estimator may have poor 
properties here going in line with the existing literature the more stable first-stage estimator  
16 
from 1 to 4.5. As higher the figure, as better the institutional framework. 
Nevertheless, the influence of the institutional framework on the size of 
remittances is not clear cut. This is due to the fact that with a better 
institutional framework the remittances based on the existence of market 
failures might decrease, while remittances caused by portfolio allocation 
considerations might increase.  
The dependent variable and most of the explanatory variables are taken in logs, and 
the resulting coefficients can thus be interpreted as elasticities. A coefficient of, say, 
0.6 on one of the logged explanatory variables (such as per capita GDP) would imply 
that a 1% increase in this variables would trigger a 0.6% increase in the dependent 
variable (such as remittances to GDP). In the baseline regression, lagged 
remittances, per capita GDP, the unemployment rate and the openness indicator are 
included. The general dataset covers the years 1990 to 2003 (for details see 
Appendix). Nevertheless, since two observations are lost because of the use of 
internal instruments for the endogenously determined variables, therefore the 
estimation sample is called ‘adjusted sample’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
is used.  
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5. Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances – Econometric Results 
 
 
The main findings are: The determinants of remittances in percent of GDP (REM 1) 
and remittances per capita (REM 2) are similar. Remittances seem to increase with 
problems of the domestic economy. There is no significant impact of the quality of the 
institutional framework on the size of remittances. While there is no evidence that 
remittances in percent of GDP are affected by war, remittances per capita increase in 
times of war and conflicts.  
In general, according to the estimation results remittances in percent of GDP as well 
remittances per capita seem to be very relatively persistent and stable over time. This 
fact is reflected in the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable which is 0.5 for 
remittances in percent of GDP and 0.66 for remittances per capita (table 4 and 5). 
The relatively high degree of persistence of remittances can be explained by the 
long-lasting character of intra-family relationships and habits. These findings are in 
line with the theoretical literature focusing on the motives of the remitter. Usually, it is 
assumed that there exists a long-term binding relationship between the remitter and 
the family of origin.  
Nevertheless, remittances depend not only on the intra-family relationship but also on 
general settings in the economy. According to the baseline model remittances 
decrease with the per capita GDP. A rise in per capita GDP by 1 percent leads a 
decrease of REM 1 by approximately 0.8 percent. The short-term effect of this 
income level variable is nearly the same for REM 2, nevertheless the coefficient is 
lower (0.6).  However, the long term impact of per capita GDP differs between both 
variables: an increase in per capita GDP is associated with a decrease of 
remittances per capita GDP and an increase of remittances per capita – an effect, 
which can be attributed to the algebra. In general, the finding that remittances 
decrease with the GDP is important, since it indicates that remittances might be 
considered as a substitute for an efficient domestic policy concerning sustainable 
growth. 
Furthermore, one of the major motives for migration might be a high unemployment 
rate in the domestic economy. But is it also a motive for sending remittances? Since 
the estimation results reported in the baseline regression show a positive sign 
concerning both dependent variables, REM 1 and REM 2, it can be stated that the  
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labor market situation in the sending country influences the size of remittances. In the 
short-run an increase of the domestic unemployment rate by 1 percent leads to an 
increase of REM 1 by 0.22 and of REM 2 by 0.29 percent. In the long-run this effect 
is much higher, increase of unemployment by 1 percent leads to an increase of REM 
1 by 1.3 percent and to an 0.7 percentage increase of REM 2. In contrast to the 
variable “unemployment” the variable “female labor participation rate” is totally 
insignificant. This result can be explained by the fact that typically in former socialist 
countries the female labor participation rate is relatively stable.  
In the literature remittances are often considered as a substitute for international 
integration of the real economy. In other words, it could be a governmental strategy 
to compensate a low international integration of the markets for goods and services 
by increasing the incentives for migration and remittances. Therefore, to analyze the 
impact of international integration on remittances the openness indicator is employed. 
Indeed, there seems to be evidence, that with an increasing degree of openness and 
therefore with a higher degree of integration into the international markets for goods 
and services the size of remittances decline. All in all, the results of the baseline 
model support the hypothesis that a high share of remittances goes in line with a high 
dependency on this kind of financial flows, a low income level in the home country of 
the remitter, high unemployment and a low integration of the real sector into 
international markets. These findings can the interpreted in the way, that the lack of a 
sufficient domestic development strategy might increase the incentives for migration 
and remittances.  
 In addition to the baseline model explained above, the influence of several factors 
which might influence the size of remittances are checked. Remittances might be not 
only caused by the recent development but also by the perspectives of the economy. 
Here, the growth rate is considered as to be a well designed indicator for the 
economic perspectives. Indeed, this variable shows a positive sign. However, 
according to estimation results growth has only is a comparable very small effect on 
remittances in the short-run. Furthermore, there is no long-run effect of growth on 
remittances in percent of GDP; the coefficient is zero. Nevertheless, a slightly 
positive long-term effect of growth on remittances per capita can be reported.  
A well functioning domestic financial market makes interfamily loans and payment 
schemes less necessary. Therefore, the access to financial resources as credits as 
well as the transaction costs in the financial sector might be important factors  
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concerning the behavior of potential remitters. According to the estimation results 
there seems to be evidence that the performance of the financial market indeed 
affects the size of remittances. A higher share of private credit to GDP, which reflects 
a better access to domestic credit of the private sector leads to a decrease in 
remittances. Higher transaction costs in the domestic banking sector go in line with 
the reverse effect, they are accompanied by an increase in remittances. These 
findings support the view, that remittances at least partly operate as a substitute for a 
well performing domestic banking sector.  
The institutional setting of the economy is also considered as to be important for the 
size of remittances. Here, we check for the impact of war and of the general 
institutional development. In general, the institutional conditions seem to be less 
important concerning remittances. Furthermore, the dummy variable “war” clearly 
shows that there is no significant influence of these conflicts on remittances per GDP. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that remittances per capita increase during times of 
war. The effect of the institutional development on remittances is captured by the 
construction of an indicator based on the transformation indices offered by the EBRD. 
According to the estimation results there can no significant influence of the 
institutional development on the size of remittances be detected.  
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Table 4:  Results - Dependent variable: Remittances/GDP 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable: 
Remittances/GDP 
      




















































































Growth     0.01 
(1.77)* 
    
Lagged growth     -0.01 
(-1.29)** 
    
Transaction costs in the domestic 
banking sector   
  0.19 
(2.36)*** 
   
Credit to the private sector          -0.15 
(-1.39)** 
  
War      0.06 
(0.62) 
 















Number  of  observation  141 141 88  137 141 141 




































Model settings   
Transformation used                First differences 




Notes:  t-values in brackets. 
  *, ** and ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
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Table 5:  Results - Dependent variable: Remittances per capita  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable: 
Remittances per capita  
      




















































































Growth per capita    0.01 
(1.52)* 
    
Lagged growth per capita    0.005 
(1.75)** 
    
Transaction costs in the domestic banking 
sector   
  0.15 
(1.97)** 
   





    0.24 
(1.79)** 
 













Number  of  observation  141 140   137 141 140 






























Model settings     
Transformation used                First differences    
Level instruments  GMM GDP per capita (lag 2,3), GMM Unemployment (lag 2), GMM Openness (lag 2,3), GMM 
Growth (lag 2,3) 
  
 
Notes:  t-values in brackets. 





After the collapse of socialist system remittances to transition countries increased 
tremendously. However, there are remarkable differences between the transition 
countries. In 2003, the top ten remittances receiving countries were Poland, the 
Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Albania, the Czech Republic, Moldova, the Slovak Republic and the Ukraine.   
Measured in percent of GDP, the highest dependency on remittances was reported in 
Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and Georgia.  
Focusing on the determinants of workers’ remittances the main findings of the study 
are: Remittances to former socialist countries are driven to by a very large extent by 
factors which are not favorable for the sending economy. It can be said that the size 
of remittances is positively affected by former remittances, unemployment and a low 
performing domestic banking sector. The impact of growth and therefore of economic 
prospect on remittances is rather small. In addition, remittances per capita increase in 
times of war. However, remittances are negatively affected by the income level and 
the degree of international integration of the real economy. All in all, it can be 
concluded that remittances are not driven and positively affected by institutional and 
economical progress. Furthermore, remittances tend to increase with the problems of 
the economy.  
The great majority of the transition countries are still in their infancy as market 
economies. Many of them have undertaken enormous efforts in terms of privatization, 
enterprise and bank reforms, competition policy, and price and trade liberalization, 
and most of them have been rewarded with substantial economic growth rates in 
recent years. According  to results of this study it can be assumed that remittances, 
measured in percent of GDP as well as remittances per capita will decrease during a 
successful catching-up process. This is an important information and a challenge for 
any government. Declining remittances might induce ceteris paribus a decline in 
demand and therefore dampen economic dynamics. One way out of this dilemma 
could be the better integration of the real sector into the international markets. 
Therefore the WTO membership would be an important step. While some transition 
economies - especially the new EU members and candidates - already joined the 
World Trade Organization, several other former socialist countries are still in the  
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progress of negotiations. An acceleration of this process could facilitate the 
international integration of the domestic economy. In addition, the government should 
increase the incentives for FDIs. Therefore, the creation of sound investment climate 
and the implementation of a stable, well designed institutional framework is 
necessary.  
However, this paper is only a first attempt to analyze the role of return migration and 
remittances in the development process of transition countries. A natural extension of 
this study would be the analysis of the determinants remittances based on data from 
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Table 1:  Country Set 
Albania  Czech Republic  Lithuania  Slovak Republic 
Armenia Estonia  Macedonia.  FYR  Slovenia 
Azerbaijan Georgia  Moldova  Ukraine 




Bulgaria Kyrgyz  Republic  Russian  Federation 




Table 2:  List of Data Sources 
Data Source 
Aid  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Credit to private 
sector (% of GDP)  
World Bank, World Development Indicators,  International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
FDI  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Female Labour Force 
Participation Rate  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Growth rate  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Openess  World Bank, World Development Indicators, International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Population  World Bank, World Development Indicators, national statistics
Remittances    World Bank, World Development Indicators, International 
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics 
Spread  World Bank, World Development Indicators, International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, national 
statistics  
Transition indicator  
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, EBRD Transition Report, own calculations 
Unemployment  World Bank, World Development Indicators, national 
statistics, EBRD Transition Report 
War  National documentation, own calculation 
  